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The Return of the State
José E. Alvarez*
I. INTRODUCTION
International lawyers are both indebted to and at war with
the state. Although we acknowledge, as we must, that states
remain the primary actors in creating, interpreting, and
enforcing international rules, we usually make this point in
passing—as we try to puncture, evade, eclipse or overtake
sovereignty. As Martti Koskenniemi’s apology/utopia dialectic
demonstrates, much of what we do attempts to reconcile the
un-reconcilable.1 This is epitomized by our efforts to portray
pacta sunt servanda as a bridge between unilateralism and
multilateralism.2 We explain that states do not relinquish, but
rather, exercise their sovereignty when they enter into a
treaty.3 This was, of course, the rationale adopted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Wimbledon
case.4
International lawyers largely define success in terms of
states’ conviction of the Wimbledon rationale—by the victory of
the supra—or multi—national over the parochial national. We
* Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York
University School of Law. This essay is an extended version of an address
delivered on Nov. 20, 2010 at the University of Minnesota Law School. The
author acknowledges the research assistance provided by the Filomen
D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund.
1. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (demonstrating how
international law’s effectiveness to depoliticize international relations is
limited by being either “an irrelevant moralist Utopia or a manipulable façade
for State interests.”).
2. See id. at 311 (describing pacta sunt servanda as the rule defining the
binding force of consent in agreements).
3. Or as Jan Klabbers puts it, the contention is that the “state can
become bound precisely because it is sovereign.” Jan Klabbers, Clinching the
Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L EUR. L. 345,
347 (1998).
4. See generally S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17)
(establishing the principle that the right to enter into international
engagements is an act of state sovereignty).
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think of ourselves as greasing the wheels that drive global
governance. This defines our professional outlook. Nearly all of
our efforts involve encouraging states to delegate away some
part of their “domestic jurisdiction.” We do this by appealing to
states’ long-term self-interest, and especially by utilizing the
multilateral side, transnational non-state actors (MNCs, NGOs,
international civil servants, and even individuals as private
attorney generals). Further, we enlist intra-state constituencies
with discrete interests, such as traders of goods seeking to
restrain the protectionist impulses of their own governments.
Consequently, all of these courses of action can influence
government policy-makers.
Our efforts to promote multilateralism or inter-state
cooperation in lieu of unilateral sovereign action cut across the
public/private international law divide. We establish global
institutions as diverse as the UN, UN specialized agencies, and
international financial institutions to centralize states’ talents
and resources or to supply needed supra-national neutrality
and independence.5 We promote these international
organizations on the premise that they fulfill needs that each
state cannot satisfy on its own.6 The age of international
organizations rests on the assumption that states, like first
year law students, should not travel alone. However, even
though global governance serves the needs of states, getting
them to accept the Wimbledon premise in discrete contexts has
not always been easy—for example, when a treaty imposes
unexpected or, given changing circumstances, temporally
inconvenient, obligations.7
5. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through
Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 14, 16 (1998)
(describing the increased efficiencies derived from the “hierarchical”
organization of IOs, in which the supervisory tasks are held by member states.
Also, the independence of IOs preserves their effectiveness in achieving valued
ends).
6. See, e.g., id. at 4 (providing examples of how states prefer to use IOs
as vehicles of cooperation. For instance, IOs provide collective security (the
UN Security Council), solve coordination problems (such as those solved by
ICAO with respect to aviation), arbitrate/adjudicate disputes, solve prisoners’
dilemmas too numerous to mention, or address threats posed by non-state
actors like pirates and terrorists).
7. Revealingly, political scientists have argued that governments resist
hard commitments because of perceived “sovereignty costs.” See Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 436-41 (2000). Revealingly, political scientists have argued
that governments resist hard commitments because of perceived “sovereignty
costs.”
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For the builders of global governance, state sovereignty is
most often a hindrance that needs to be overcome. It is not the
favored ordering mechanism among today’s leading thinkers of
global governance, and as a result, there is an increasing
tendency to reduce or eliminate its application.8 For those
focused on states’ threats to the human rights of their citizens,
such as the late great Louis Henkin, sovereignty was the hated
“S” word that needed to be banned from polite lawyerly
discourse.9 Global and regional human rights systems respond
almost entirely to the threat that sovereignty, unabated and
unrestrained, poses.10 Those who strengthened the GATT’s
weak dispute settlement scheme at the Uruguay Round devised
end-runs around state sovereignty, such as the reverse
consensus rule that makes WTO panel and Appellate Body
rulings binding.11 The WTO’s house rests on the proposition
that leaving matters to bilateral diplomatic leverage would
impoverish us all.12 Even modern regimes built on
bilateralism—such
as
that
governing
international
investment—turned to bilateral treaties only after various
multilateral efforts failed.13 Bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) are efforts by states to bind themselves to the mast to
avoid the tempting sirens calling for breaches of investment
contracts or nationalizations without compensation.14 BITs also
8. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 3, at 346 (noting as examples AnneMarie Slaughter’s network of transnational regulators and John Tasioulas’s
defense of community values).
9. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, ASIL NEWSLETTER (Am.
Soc’y Int’l Law, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 1993, at par. 11, available at
http:///www.asil.org/pres.htm.
10. See id. par. 8 (indicating that state sovereignty is subject to the social
contract in the UN Charter).
11. See WTO Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settl
ement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (identifying that reverse
consensus occurs “when the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] establishes
panels, when it adopts panel and Appellate Body reports and when it
authorizes retaliation, the DSB must approve the decision unless there is a
consensus against it.”).
12. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment
Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 612 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al eds.,
2011)(providing an opinion of BITs as being “‘contracts of adhesion’ imposed
on the willing poor by the rich.”).
13. See, e.g., id. at 625 (indicating how “by the end of 2008, more countries
had entered into at least one investment protection agreement (179 countries)
than had joined the WTO.”).
14. See id. at 620 n.68 (describing BITs as reliable “commitment devices”
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involve relinquishments of sovereign “policy space” in deference
to the greater good.15
The papers presented at this conference on “International
Economic Law in a Time of Change” demonstrate that the
global governance tradition—and the urge to defend and
improve it–is alive and well. A number of these papers continue
to propose, in the best tradition carved out by those “present at
the creation,” new forms of supra-national governance, needed
reforms to harden international regulation, or ways to fill
regulatory gaps with more law. Included in this category are
the articles of Adam Feibelman (who addresses the problem of
unmanaged exchange rates),16 Aldo Caliarai and Ioana
Ciobanasu (on needed reforms for the IMF),17 Galit Sarfaty (on
the need to harmonize anti-corruption efforts among
multilateral development banks),18 Sarah Woo (on the need for
regulatory reforms to respond to a group of non-state actors,
namely credit rating agencies),19 Markus Wagner (on how to
improve the WTO’s handling of disputes involving analysis of
scientific evidence),20 Janelle Diller (on the need for greater
complementarity with respect to applicable regimes on
international product standards),21 Andrea Schneider and
since they extend protection in the absence of a contract and offer greater
protection than political risk insurance).
15. See, e.g., id. at 627 (demonstrating how the benefits of foreign
investment come at the cost of decreased sovereignty through the granting of
reciprocal rights to all investors).
16. Adam Feibelman, The IMF and the Future of International Monetary
Law (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of International Law).
17. Aldo Caliari, Updating the International Monetary System to Respond
to Current Global Challenges: Can It Happen Within the Existing Legal
Framework?, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011); Ioana C. Ciobanasu,
Expanded Mandate for the IMF: Global Financial Stability 20 MINN. J. INT’L.
L. ONLINE (forthcoming 2011).
18. Galit Sarfaty, Abstract, Harmonization of Anti-Corruption Efforts
Among Multilateral Development Banks (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
19. Sarah P. Woo, Super Disclosure is Not Enough: Examining the
Benefits and Costs of New Credit Rating Regulations (Nov. 11, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law).
20. Markus Wagner, Abstract, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages
of Law and Science in WTO Proceedings (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
21. Janelle M. Diller, The Interaction of Private International
Standardization with Public International Law (Nov. 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
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Nancy Welsh (on whether the investment regime can be
improved by a greater reliance on mediation),22 and Krista
Nadakavukaren Schefer (on the likely impact of R2P for
international economic regimes).23 Others explore lesser known
reaches of global governance, such as Michelle Badin’s look at
the impact of the WTO’s dispute settlement system on the civil
aircraft sector,24 or Doak Bishop and Ben Love’s analysis of the
use of soft law by investor-state arbitrators.25 Some see new
forms of global governance or describe old ones in new ways.
For instance, Claire Kelly and Sungjoon Cho describe the G20
as the helm of a new global governance order that intersects
with the WTO, UNCTAD and OECD.26 David Zaring compares
global regimes that deploy rule-making techniques with those
who use adjudication.27 Some, like Jessica Lawrence, Gareth
Davies and Laurens Ankersmit, Elizabeth Trujillo, and
Valentina S. Vadi explore fragmentations dilemmas posed by
our disparate schemes for global governance.28
Still others address the issue of why multilateral
22. Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Application of Dispute
System Design Principles and Procedural Justice Theories to the Potential
Use of Mediation and Other Consensual Processes in the Investor-State
Context (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of
International Law).
23. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Responsibility to Protect: A New
Direction for International (Economic) Law? (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
24. Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Public and Private Actors Redefining
the WTO Adjudicatory System Role in the Global Arena: Examples from the
Civil Aircraft Business (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of International Law).
25. R. Doak Bishop & Ben Love, Abstract, The Increasing Influence of
Soft Law in International Disputes (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
26. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global
Governance: A Case of the G20(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
27. David Zaring, Developing Paradigms For Thinking About
International Financial Regulation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
28. Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence & Gareth Davies, Diverging EU
and WTO Perspectives on Extraterritorial Process Regulation (Nov. 4, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law); Elizabeth Trujillo, Abstract, Tuna/Dolphin Revisited: Trade
Implications for Climate Change Regulation (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law); Valentina S. Vadi,
Abstract, Unity in Diversity? Cultural Diversity Disputes and the Judicial
Function in International Economic Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
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regulation continues to elude us in distinct areas. This includes
Odette Lienau’s look at how basic notions of sovereignty
constrain our solutions to sovereign debt problems,29 Alexandra
Koutoglidou’s exploration of how immunity from execution, as
“the last fortress, the last bastion of [s]tate immunity,”30
continues to hinder international arbitral mechanisms,
Chunbao Liu’s examination of the challenges faced by those
who seek to liberalize international labor flows,31 Caroline
Bradley’s enumeration of the hazards of ad hoc efforts to
develop transnational standards for financial regulation,32 and
Shashank Kumar and Mehana Sharafudeen’s critical view of
certain national laws seeking to protect intellectual property
through extraterritorial effect.33 Most of these authors take
Henkin to heart; they too see the “S” word as a troublesome
hindrance.
A closer look at some of the papers presented at this
conference, however, suggests some cross-currents at odds with
the expected Grotian narrative. Some of their authors describe,
but do not endorse, the particular global regimes under
consideration. Jide Nzelibe (who writes of the unholy alliance
between Republicans and Democrats in the United States that
has led to differing results with respect to U.S. participation in
multilateral regimes),34 Julian Ku (who criticizes judicial
assumptions on the status of corporations),35 Jason Yackee
(who questions whether BITs promote flows of foreign direct
29. Odette Lienau, Emerging Norms of Sovereignty in International Debt
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law).
30. Alexandra Koutoglidou, Abstract, Foreign Investors’ Right Of Access
To International Justice vs. State Immunity From Execution (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
31. Chunbao Liu, Abstract, Liberalizing Labour Mobility Through
Regional Trade Agreements: The Experience of China (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
32. Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational
Standard-Setting, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011).
33. Shashank P. Kumar & Meghana Sharafudeen, Abstract,
Extraterritoriality of Intellectual Property Law in an Era of Globalization: The
Doctrine of “Manufacturing Fiction” and Goods in Transit (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
34. Jide Nzelibe, Strategic Globalization: International Law as an
Extension of Domestic Political Conflict (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
35. Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International
Law (Nov. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota
Journal of International Law).
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investment),36 and Anu Bradford and Travis Bradford (who
contend that multilateral negotiations on climate change are
self-defeating),37 evince no enthusiasm for the international
regimes they address.
A number of the presenters remind us of the serious gaps—
in coverage or effectiveness—of our existing forms of global
governance, but do not propose that we fill these with more
global law. Aunpam Chander, for example, addresses the
problems of regulating cloud computing by focusing on very
traditional conflict of laws questions, namely, which territory is
best suited to address the question.38 Some presenters appear
to be entertaining second thoughts about the turn to global
governance itself, questioning whether additional global
regulation or binding international adjudication is really a good
idea. Juscelino Colares, who identifies the limits of WTO
adjudication as a source of the regime’s strength,39 Alexia
Marks, who outlines the beneficial deterrence impact of
national product liability laws,40 Jarrod Wong, who examines
the bottom-up aspects of clawback statutes on corporate
governance without need for international regulation,41 or
Joseph Yackey, who suggests that extraterritorial national
regulation for passive corruption might be a good idea,42 fall
into this camp.
Some presenters echo my theme here, namely that states
are staging a comeback. Tania Voon’s and Andrew Mitchell’s
36. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence (Mar. 22,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of
International Law).
37. Anu Bradford & Travis Bradford, The Peril of a Weak Climate Treaty:
When Markets Will Do (Nov. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
38. Anupam Chander, Abstract, Law in the Cloud (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
39. Juscelino F. Colares, The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance
the Problem? (Oct. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
40. Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Evaluating the Means of
Deterrence in the Food Industry (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
41. Jarrod Wong, The International Phenomenon of Clawbacks
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law).
42. Joseph W. Yackey, Abstract, Passive Corruption and Transnational
Firms: A Regulatory Analysis (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of International Law).
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paper on the Australian federal government’s efforts to
establish a company, majority owned by the government, to
deliver superfast broadband services,43 signals that even with
respect to that most “global” of phenomena—the web—states
are not helpless supplicants beholden to external developments
and forms of regulation. Their paper reminds us that countries
such as China appear to be surprisingly resilient when it comes
to protecting themselves as sovereigns from the web’s effects.
Similarly,
Efraim
Chaiamish’s
paper
on
“state-run
capitalism”44 illustrates that states continue to exist as
economic actors as a result, or independently of, the global
economic crisis. Despite the rise of the market, states have not
been privatized out of the picture. Mariana Prado’s study of
Brazilian privatization efforts with respect to the electricity
versus telecommunications sectors takes us even further.45 It is
second-generation
privatization
scholarship,
which
demonstrates that, notwithstanding global efforts to encourage
privation, governments retain considerable discretion
regarding privatization and whether their actions remain
subject to transnational scrutiny.
My own theme—the return of the state—is most directly
suggested by Koutoglidou’s paper on sovereign immunity,46
Yackee’s questioning the desirability of BITs,47 and the work of
Alvaro Santos, Nicole Foster, and John Baloro, which critiques
international development policy from the perspective of the
“South.”48 Some of these authors remind us that the
43. Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, International Trade Law Implications
of Australia’s National Broadband Network (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
44. EfraimChaiamish, Abstract, International Law and State Capitalism
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law).
45. Mariana Mota Prado, Transnational Influences on National
Regulatory Reform in Large Developing Countries: Brazil's Contrasting
Experiences in Electricity and Telecommunications Governance (Nov. 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of International
Law).
46. Koutoglidou, supra note 30.
47. Yackee, supra note 36.
48. Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries
in the WTO (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of
International Law); Nicole D. Foster, Abstract, The WTO, Developing
Countries and the Problem of Development (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law); John Baloro, Abstract, The
BIT Gold Rush: Emerging Voices of Dissent from the South with Specific
Reference to the Experience of South Africa (unpublished manuscript) (on file
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international investment regime—the contemporary regime
that has displaced the WTO among critics of globalization and
has been seen as the greatest threat to sovereignty—is actually
in the throes of serious sovereign backlash. The regime most
criticized for ignoring the will of states49 has become the
foremost example of their persistent power.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME AND SOVEREIGNTY
The United States established its BIT program in the
1980s.50 Though a latecomer to the investment regime, when
the United States decided to join the movement away from
trade-oriented treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCNs)—whose raison d’etre was undercut by the
emergence of the GATT—to investment protection agreements,
it elevated investor protection to a new high. The United
States’ early Model BITs of 1984-87 were the most investorprotective in the world.51 Those treaties deployed every
lawyerly device imaginable to achieve a single unitary object
and purpose: to protect the foreign investor. Unlike many of the
earlier European BITs, the U.S. Model BITs of 1984-87
protected the entry and post-entry treatment of investment.52
These treaties gave investors the better of national and most
favored treatment, subject only to delimited sectoral
exceptions; provided additional assurances against any other
discriminatory or arbitrary treatment; gave investors a treaty
right to demand access to national court remedies; accorded
them the better of any treatment accorded under national law,
customary international law, and the absolute guarantees of
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and
with the Minnesota Journal of International Law).
49. See, e.g., Press Release, Osgoode Hall Law School of Law, Public
Statement on the International Investment Regime, at (Aug. 31, 2010),
available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/. (expressing
concern regarding the “hampering of the ability of governments to act for their
people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental
sustainability.”).
50. For a description of the origins of the U.S. BIT program, see Kenneth
J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 7–43 (1992).
51. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 4 TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTE MGMT. 1, 2–6 (2010) (recalling the 1984 Model BIT’s history and
impact ).
52. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 50, at 35 (remarking on concern that a
tougher US BIT would be hard to negotiate when countries were familiar with
the weaker European version).
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security;” extended the Hull Rule assuring prompt, adequate
and effective payment if expropriated to all measures,
including indirect regulatory acts that were “tantamount to
expropriation;” included a comprehensive umbrella clause that
turned all breaches of host state-investor contracts into treaty
breaches; and provided an iron-clad guarantee that violations
of any of these rights could be taken at the option of the
investor to international arbitration, notwithstanding any
clause to the contrary in the investors’ contract with the host
state.53 The U.S. Model BIT of that period set out to regulate
the state. It set a new standard for investor protection that
became widely emulated when the Berlin Wall fell and
countries donned Thomas Friedman’s “golden straightjacket”54
as everyone sought to at least appear a capitalist.55 Most of the
U.S. BIT’s measures to protect investors became standard
during the golden age of the proliferation of BITs, namely the
1990s.56
Foreign investment protection is now practiced globally.
Today, some 3000 international investment agreements (IIAs)
exist, including BITs and investment chapters in free trade
agreements (FTAs).57 More countries are party to at least one
BIT than are members of the WTO.58 BITs are not just popular
with Western capital exporting nations. Today’s leading BIT
nations include China and Egypt, as even developing nations
have multilateral enterprises requiring protection elsewhere.59
53. José E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Investment Regime, in
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 607, 616 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, et al. eds.,) (forthcoming
2011).
54. See Thomas L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 101–11 (First Anchor Books 2000).
55. See Alvarez, supra note 53, at 614-23.
56. Id.; See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994
U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, Y.B. ON
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009 283, 284 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
57. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010,
World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, 81–82
[hereinafter
World
Investment
Report
2010]
(available
at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf).
58. See, e.g., Trade and Development Board: Investment, Enterprise and
Development Commission Multi-Year Expert Meeting on Investment for
Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, Feb. 10-12, 2009, The Development
Dimension of International Investment Agreements, 2, TD/B/C.II/MEM.3/2
(Dec. 2, 2008) (noting that 179 countries had entered into at least one
investment protection agreement through 2008).
59. See, e.g., Lisa E. Sachs and Karl P. Sauvant, “BITs, DTTs, and FDI
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Cuba has concluded more BITs than the U.S.,60 and today,
about a third of the total number of IIAs have been concluded
between developing states.61 Moreover, although the
international investment regime consists largely of bilateral
agreements, investment protections increasingly appear in
multi-party agreements such as the Energy Charter62 and the
CAFTA.63 The rights accorded investors also find significant
support in multilateral instruments promulgated by the OECD,
and the advice and actions of the IFC, the World Bank, the
IMF, and regional development banks. Indeed, one scholar
plausibly portrays the IMF and its approach to conditionality
as a de facto international investment regulator.64
These international efforts also have a domestic
component. As the annual UNCTAD surveys of domestic
investment laws indicate, since 1992 when these studies began,
the vast proportion of new regulatory changes were—consistent
with the proliferation of BITs—“liberalization” or “promotion”
measures.65 Throughout the 1990s, UNCTAD characterized
over 90 percent of national regulatory changes as intended to
be more hospitable to aliens with capital.66 In addition, starting
in the mid-1990s but especially since 2000, the amount of
investment treaty arbitrations disclosed to the public have
dramatically increased.67 Today, with over 350 known investorstate claims either pending or concluded,68 the driving force of
international investment law is not the proliferation of treaties
or the adoption of liberalizing national laws, but is rather, the
ever more abundant (and usually effective) arbitral awards.
Flows: An Overview,” in The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment
xxvii, at xxx fig. 8 (Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, ed. 2009) (table of ten
countries with highest number of BITs).
60. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 178, 181.
61. Id. at 177-81.
62. See generally About the 1994 Energy Charter, ENERGY CHARTER,
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28.
63. See generally Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta.
64. See Daniel Kalderimis, IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation:
A Theoretical Analysis, 13 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 104, 113-119 (2004).Daniel
Kalderimis, “IMF Conditionality as Investment Regulation: A Theoretical
Analysis,” 13 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 104, at 113-19 (2004).
65. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 76
66. Id.
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id.
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These rulings have considerably elaborated the bare bones
guarantees contained in BITs or FTAs.
History, however, did not stop with the end of the Cold
War. As Yackee’s paper in particular reminds us, the
international investment regime has been the victim of its own
success and is buffeted by opposing cross currents.69 The
proliferation of investor-state disputes have come with a price:
many of the states that established the regime are having
second thoughts about the amount of sovereign “policy space”
they have ceded. Many are exercising some of their exit and
voice options (this includes, as we shall see, most prominently
the regime’s once most prominent cheerleader, the United
States, which is, at this writing, among the most frequent
respondent states under investor-state dispute settlement).70
To be sure, states have not stopped concluding BITs and they
have not ceased making their national laws and practices
investor-friendly. Over the course of 2009 alone, states
concluded eighty-two new BITs along with another twenty
IIAs.71 UNCTAD’s latest report of national policy developments
tells us that in that year, of 102 policy measures affecting FDI,
a little less than 70 percent supported its liberalization and
promotion.72
At the same time, the report indicates that more than 30
percent of national policy changes surveyed were in the
opposite direction, providing for greater regulation and
restriction, the highest proportion since UNCTAD began its
surveys in 1992.73 UNCTAD’s examples of these restrictions
reveal how some countries are re-asserting their “sovereign
rights” vis-à-vis foreign investors. Measures enacted in 2009
that restricted the entry of foreign investors included Algeria’s
new requirement of a 49 percent equity share limit on foreign
investors seeking to produce for the domestic market;
Australia’s tightening of its rules on foreign investment in
residential real estate; and Canada’s and Germany’s revisions
69. Yackee, supra note 36.
70. According to UNCTAD, by the end of 2009, the number of countries
subject to known investor-state claims stood at eighty-one (including 489
developing countries, 17 developed countries and 15 economies in transition).
World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 83.
71. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 82.
72. Id., at 76.
73. By comparison, according to UNCTAD’s annual surveys, in 2000 only
2 percent of national investment measures were non-liberalizing or restrictive.
Id. fig.III.1.
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to their respective laws to authorize governmental review of
investments that impair or threaten national security.74
Meanwhile, measures in that year adversely affecting
established investors included Bolivia’s nationalization of
several
electric
generation
companies;
Venezuela’s
nationalization of a foreign controlled bank; Indonesia’s
requirement for divestment of foreign investments in mining to
local parties; Kazakhstan’s imposition of Kazakh content
requirements and its requirement that Kazakh service provides
need to employ no less than 95 percent Kazakh nationals; and
Nigeria’s domestic content requirements with respect to oil and
gas.75
Furthermore, the fact that many states continue to enter
into BITs or FTAs is a bit misleading. The most recent crop of
these treaties tends not to resemble the investor-protective U.S.
Model BIT of 1984. Instead, many recent investment protection
treaties accord FDI host states greater room to maneuver,76
while simultaneously granting foreign investors fewer rights.77
The changes to the U.S. Model BIT over time—clearly
manifested if we use the language of the U.S. Model BIT of
1984 for comparison, from the heyday of investor-protection, to
the considerably more hedged terms of its Model BIT of 2004—
suggest what is happening elsewhere.78 If the United States led
the charge in favor of investor protections, it now appears to be
leading the drive in the opposite direction. The 2004 U.S. Model
BIT is at least twice as long as it once was—and as every
lawyer knows, the length of a treaty is often inversely related
to the rights that it accords. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT has now
shrunk, sometimes dramatically, virtually every right
originally accorded to foreign investors while at the same time
increasing, sometimes vastly, the discretion accorded host
states. That Model:
 “re-balances”
through
preamblar
language
and
exceptions, the rights accorded investors in favor of
states’ rights to protect health, safety, and the
environment;
74. Id. at 80 box III.4
75. Id., box III.5.
76. See, e.g., OECD, Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent
Investment Agreements: An Overview, 12 Dec. 2005, para. 10.
77. See, e.g., id. para. 1577.
78. For a comparison chart of the two texts, see Annex A, supra note 51,
at 22–32.
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 narrows the definition of covered investment by, for
example, excluding some forms of debt or licenses;
 narrows national and MFN treatment by, for example,
imposing fewer constraints on the sectors that a state
can exclude from such obligations, exempting local
government measures, and by indicating that the MFN
clause in post 2004 BITs does not provide investors
under them the right to claim any better rights
accorded under the US’s older BITs;
 eliminates the additional protection against arbitrary or
discriminatory measures;
 eliminates the umbrella clause;
 reduces the scope of fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security guarantees to those which
would have been accorded under the “customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens;”
 omits the old provision assuring investors’ rights to
pursue claims in national courts;
 excludes from investor-state dispute settlement any
claims based on denial of transparency in
administrative proceedings;
 restricts the scope of cognizable regulatory takings
claims, indicating that “except in rare circumstances,”
non-discriminatory regulatory actions taken to protect
public welfare do not constitute an indirect taking;
 requires investors to first seek the approval of
government tax authorities before taking certain
investment claims based on tax measures to
arbitration;
 otherwise restricts the ambit of investment arbitrators’
discretion and/or elevating the costs of bringing such
claims by imposing new 90 day notice of claims, a three
year statute of limitations, and new transparency and
participation requirements;
 permits the state parties to the treaty to issue binding
interpretations of their agreement, even in anticipation
of known claims or in the course of pending
arbitrations;
 permits state parties to invoke much more expansive
exceptions to justify measures “relating to financial
services for prudential reasons;” “in pursuit of
monetary and related credit policies or exchange rate
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policies;” and to protect their “essential security.”79
As a result of these changes, it is hard to say exactly what
the object and purpose of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT is. The
combination of the changes to its preamble, more restricted
investor rights, and its more expansive list of state exceptions,
suggest that its object and purpose now includes the right of
host states to regulate as they please. The elevation of the
power of the host state is perhaps most evident with respect to
the United States’ efforts to clarify that a state’s decision to
invoke “essential security” to justify any measure, no matter
how detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, is a nonreviewable, self-judging action that renders an investor’s
arbitration claim inadmissible.80
As with respect to its pro-investor Model predecessor, the
United States is influencing other countries’ Model BITs by the
power of its example. If the world’s leading capital exporter, the
state responsible for establishing the Hull Rule, for discrediting
the Calvo Clause, and for creating a perfected investor-state
arbitration clause is now emphasizing the need to protect its
sovereign prerogatives, others are sure to follow. They have.
The latest Canadian Model Investment Protection Treaty
closely resembles the 2004 U.S. Model,81 and many of the
sovereign-protective innovations in post-2004 U.S. investment
agreements are now appearing in recent Chinese treaties,
including those between China and Mexico, China and New
Zealand, and China and India.82 UNCTAD’s latest investment
79. See Alvarez, supra note 51, at 9-11.
80. See
2004
U.S.
Model
BIT,
art.
18
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (permitting a state
party to take measures “which it considers” necessary to protect its “essential
security”). Note that the self-judging nature of this exception is made even
more express in the 2006 Peru-U.S. FTA which, in addition, provides that “if a
party invokes [the essential security clause] in an arbitral proceeding . . . the
tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find that the exception applies.”
U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, June 28, 2007, 22-1 n.2 (available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/
asset_upload_file841_9542.pdf). For a discussion of the evolving position of the
U.S. toward the “essential security” exception contained in its investment
treaties, see José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and
Foreign Investors: A Glimpse Into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in Y.B.
ON INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009 379, 421–24 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
81. Compare Canada 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection
Agreement,
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Canadian2004-FIPA-modelen.pdf), with 2004 U.S. Model BIT, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizati
on/ 117601.pdf.
82. Alvarez, supra note 51, at 12.
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report tells us that Russia, France, Columbia, Mexico, Austria
and Germany have all recently concluded a review process of
their respective model BITs while comparable reviews are ongoing in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Morocco, Bolivia,
South Africa and Turkey.83 In most cases, the stated reasons
are to ensure consistency with the public interest, adjust the
old model to new developments, and seek a “balance between
protecting investor and host country.”84 Like the changes to the
U.S. Model, more recent BITs include more general exceptions
that allow host states greater regulatory space, restrictions (or
“clarifications”) to specific investor rights, and greater carve
outs from investor-state arbitration.85
The power of the U.S. example has also been felt with
respect to the screening of incoming foreign investment to
protect the states’ “essential” or “national security” interests.
The United States, which adopted an elaborate statutory
scheme permitting the President to bar mergers and
acquisitions involving foreign investors that pose such threats,
strengthened its scrutiny over incoming investments after the
Dubai Ports deal debacle and perceived threats from the entry
of state-owned enterprises, particularly from China.86 As a
result, in the United States today, more potential M&As
involving a foreigner are scrutinized, delayed, or, in rare
instances, derailed, under governmental scrutiny.87 Other
states are following the U.S. lead in adopting or strengthening
their own national security screening mechanisms.88 Countries,
83. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 85.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 86–88.,
86. See, e.g., Mark E. Plotkin & David N. Fagan, Foreign Direct
Investment and U.S. National Security: CFIUS Under the Obama
Administration, 24 COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 24, June 7, 2010,
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/print/Fagan_and_Plotkin-_Final_0.pdf
[hereinafter FDI and U.S. National Security]; Mark E. Plotkin & David N.
Fagan, The Revised National Security Review Process for FDI in the US,
FDI
PERSP.,
No.
2,
Jan.
7,
2009,
COLUM.
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/Perspective2PlotkinandFagan.pdf.
87. See FDI and U.S. National Security, supra note 86 (indicating that the
United States has escalated the percentage of transactions that proceed to the
second stage, a 45 day investigation before the CFIUS, and that the pace of
such reviews has slowed down “materially” in 2009).
88. See, e.g., Subrata Bhattacharjee, National Security with a Canadian
Twist: The Investment Canada Act and the New National Security Review
Test, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No 10, July 30 2009, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/fi
les/ vale/print/ICA_Perspective-_Final.pdf.
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including the United States, tend not to adopt clear definitions
of what exactly threatens their “security” or, particularly after
9/11, transparent procedures for making such determinations.
These factors, particularly when combined with the self-judging
element essential to security clauses in BITs, threaten to
eviscerate the right of entry once enjoyed by foreign investors
(at least under older U.S. BITs). Of course, many countries,
including Canada, have a long history of screening incoming
foreign investment on a variety of other grounds; national
security is merely the latest governmental tool.89
BIT signatories have also found other ways to re-assert
their sovereign prerogatives. In January 2008, Ecuador
expressed its intention to withdraw from its BITS with Cuba,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, and Uruguay.90 That country’s
constitutional court ruled another four BITs unconstitutional
and Ecuador has further withdrawn from the ICSID
Convention.91 Bolivia has similarly withdrawn from ICSID.92
For its part, Venezuela, along with some of its Andean
neighbors, has introduced significant changes to its national
laws in derogation of the rights of foreign investors while
refusing to renew its BIT with the Netherlands.93 Russia
89. See id.
90. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 85.
91. Id. at 85–86. Ecuador withdrew from the ICSID Convention in
January 2010. Joshua M. Robbins, Ecuador Withdraws from ICSID
LAW
COMPANY
(12-Aug-2009),
Convention,
PRACTICAL
http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/2-422-1266.
92. For a discussion of the implications of Bolivia’s May 2, 2007 notice to
the World Bank indicating its intent to withdraw from ICSID, see Marco E.
Schnabl & Julie Bédard, The Wrong Kind of ‘Interesting’, NAT’L L. J. (London),
Jul. 30, 2007 (available at http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/1910
231238362.pdf). For a description of other developments demonstrative of
sovereign “backlash” against the investment regime, see, e.g., Karl P. Sauvant,
Regulatory Risk and the Growth of FDI, in WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO
2011: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK
67 (available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/WorldInvestmen
tProspectsto2011.pdf).
93. For an account of the changes in foreign investment laws in Venezuela
and other Andean countries, see Leonardo Stanley, Natural Resources &
Foreign Investors: A Tale of Three Andean Countries, WORKING GROUP ON
DEV. & ENV’T IN THE AMERICAS, Discussion Paper 16 (April 2008),
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP16StanleyApr08.pdf. For an analysis of
the implications of Venezuela’s termination of its BIT with the Netherlands,
see Ramon Ramirez Quijada, The “Survival Clause” In the NetherlandsVenezuelan BIT: A Salvation Gateway for Foreign Investment in the Oil Sector
or a Curse for the Venezuelan Government?, CTR. FOR ENERGY, PETROLEUM &
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decided not to become a party to the Energy Charter, while
several European countries have abrogated intra-EU BITs.94
Indeed, renegotiating old BITs is now keeping a number of
foreign ministries busy.95 UNCTAD reports that nineteen BITs
were renegotiated in 2009 alone, with the Czech Republic being
the most active.96
Nor is this the end of the story. At this writing, the U.S.
Model BIT remains a work in progress and may continue to
evolve. Back in the United States, the Obama Administration
has suspended at least some pending BIT negotiations while it
undertakes yet another review of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.97 A
recent divided and inconclusive advisory committee report to
the U.S. State Department makes it doubtful that the
Administration will release a revised U.S. model any time
soon.98 That report, like recent testimony before Congress,
revealed sharp divisions between business representatives and
the regime’s critics, including representatives of the labor
movement, academics and NGOs.99 While business groups
would welcome a return to the more investor-protective
provisions of earlier U.S. Model BITs, others contend that the
post-2004 changes to U.S. agreements do not go far enough to
protect sovereign “policy space.”100 Some recommend adopting a
general exceptions clause comparable to that in Article XX of
the GATT, replacing absolute guarantees like fair and
equitable treatment with a simple ban on discrimination,
MINERAL L. & POL’Y, 1 (June 4, 2009), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/
gateway/files.php?file=CAR-12_29_262236660.pdf.
94. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 86.
95. See Ravinder Casley Gera, International Investment: End of the Boom?
MAGAZINE
(London)
(2007)
(available
at
22
CHAMBERS
http://www.chambersmagazine.co.uk/Article/International-arbitrationINVESTMENT-ARBITRATION---The-end-of-the-boom).
96. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 57, at 86.
97. See, e.g., “US Suspends Talks on BIT with Pakistan, PAK. TRIB.
(Lahore), Sept. 17, 2010, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?231620
.http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print&id_article=18130http://www.b
ilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print&id_article=18130.
98. See Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory
Committee on International Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/
othr/2009/131118.htm (“The key reality reflected very clearly in our twentyfour page Subcommittee report is that our group was divided on
the most fundamental question.”).
99. See id, annex B (providing viewpoints of subcommittee members).
100. See, e.g., id. (statement of Shaun Donnelly, Senior Dir. for Int’l Bus.
Pol’y, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfg.).
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requiring investors to exhaust local remedies prior to seeking
international arbitration, or, most radical of all, eliminating
investor-state dispute settlement altogether in deference to
resolution by the local courts of the host state.101
Business groups fear that at some point the effort to
protect sovereign discretion will render a BIT negotiation an
entirely pointless exercise. That such an outcome is possible is
suggested by the example of Norway, which in 2007, released a
model BIT so protective of Norway’s sovereign prerogatives to
regulate that Norwegian business groups withdrew their
support from the effort.102 Norway’s effort to please all sides
ended with a suspended BIT program. For some, the 2004 U.S.
Model BIT may have already gone too far in the direction of
protecting sovereign discretion.103 Daniel Price, a former BIT
negotiator, fears that changes to the U.S. Model will only lessen
the value of these treaties; he argues that a BIT that merely
affirms that investors have the right to be treated like all other
national investors and have their rights decided only by local
courts returns us to the days of Carlos Calvo, when South
American states reacted to U.S. gunboat diplomacy in favor of
U.S. investors by refusing to participate in international
arbitration altogether.104 Despite Price’s fears, the odds are
good that if the United States were to release a new model
treaty, the starting point will be the 2004 model and more
sovereignty-protective changes will be added.
But if, as indicated, international investment law is driven
by the jurisprudence produced by investment arbitrators, does
that jurisprudence provide a firewall to protect foreign
investors against trends in favor of “re-balancing?” This is far
from clear. Consider, by way of example, three of the most
recent annulment rulings rendered in the on-going saga of the
101. For background on the Subcommittee and the options being urged on
the U.S. as it reviews its BIT program, see Kevin P. Gallagher, U.S. BITs and
Financial Stability, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No 19, Feb. 23, 2010,
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/print/Gallagher-_Final.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, Investment Treaty News, (Int’l Inst. for
Sustainable
Dev.,
Geneva,
Switz.),
June
8,
2009,
at
7,
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/ITN-June-2009.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of
International Law, 3 Transnational Dispute Management, Apr. 2006 (online
journal article at transnational-dispute-management.com).
104. See Daniel M. Price, Keep International Protections; Bilateral Treaties
and Free Trade Agreements Are Key, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A17.
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leading respondent state in investor-state arbitration,
Argentina. All of these cases involved claims by U.S. companies
operating privatized utilities in Argentina. In all cases, the
underlying claims, involving alleged breaches of the umbrella
clause, fair and equitable treatment, and expropriation clauses
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, resulted from Argentina’s
“emergency legislation,” adopted in response to the country’s
economic and political crisis starting in 2001.105 In all cases, a
principal issue concerned the interpretation of the treaty’s
‘measures not precluded clause’ which permits state parties to
take measures to maintain public order or to protect their
essential security interests.106 The three underlying decisions
under challenge before ICSID annulment committees involved
the companies of CMS, Sempra, and Enron; all three had
rendered multi-million dollar decisions in favor of the U.S.
claimants.107 All three panels decided that the measures not
precluded clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be read in
light of the underlying customary defense of necessity,
requiring states to demonstrate that any measures taken in
response to an essential or grave peril were the “only”
measures possible and that the state invoking such measures
did not significantly contribute to the underlying peril.108
The first annulment decision, in CMS, upheld the
underlying award but not without extensive dicta indicating
that had the scope of review been more generous and not
restricted as it is under ICSID, they would have found the
original panel’s ruling as to the meaning of the measures not
precluded clause to have been erroneous.109 The CMS
annulment committee opined that it was wrong to equate the
105. For a thorough description of these cases, see Alvarez & Khamsi,
supra note 80, at 379–407.
106. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) [hereinafter
U.S.-Arg. BIT].
107. Sempra Energy Int’l. v. Argentine Rep. (Sempra Decision), ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/02/16,
Award,
para.
486
(Sept.
28,
2007),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId =DC694_En&caseId=C8; Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. v. Argentine Rep. (Enron Decision), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
para. 450 (May 22, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf;
CMS Transmission Co. v. Argentine Rep. (CMS Decision), ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, para. 472 (May 12, 2005), 14 ICSID Rep. 152 (2009).
108. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80 , at 396–402.396-402.
109. CMS Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 120–27, 129–36,
144–49.
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treaty clause—which in their view was a “primary” rule
obviating liability—to the secondary rule contained in the
customary defense of necessity (which arguably does not
eliminate liability even when properly invoked).110
The second annulment decision, in Sempra, applied the
dicta of the CMS decision and decided that the original Sempra
panel manifestly exceeded its powers in applying the customary
defense of necessity instead of the measures not precluded
clause of the BIT.111 It annulled the award in its entirety.112
The third annulment decision, in Enron, upheld the
underlying finding that the measures not precluded clause of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be read in light of the
customary defense of necessity.113 To this extent, the Enron
annulment committee rejected both the dicta in the CMS
annulment and the Sempra annulment ruling. However, the
Enron annulment committee nonetheless annulled the
underlying Enron award on a different ground. It found that
the original panel had failed to apply the relevant law because
it relied on the wrong reasons and the wrong evidence in
rejecting Argentina’s customary defense of necessity.114 The
Enron annulment committee ruled that the original panel did
not address the meaning of the customary defense’s
requirement that the state relying on the defense not have
“contributed to the situation of necessity.”115 It found that the
panel had erroneously relied on evidence presented by an
economic expert who failed to address the underlying legal
questions, such as whether the aspect of the defense requires
the state to have been shown to be “blameworthy” for its
conduct, “regardless of whether or not the State could have in
any way foreseen that its conduct would contribute to a
situation of necessity.”116
All of these annulment rulings evince strongly sovereignty
protective interpretations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. All three
come up with striking and surprising conclusions in the context
of a treaty that is, on all relevant matters, indistinguishable
from the strongly investor-protective U.S. Model of 1984.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. paras. 130–33,130-33, 146.
Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 216–19, 221–22.
Id.
Enron Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, para. 356.
Id. paras. 368-95.
Id. paras. 385–94.
Id. para. 387.
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Whether or not the annulment committees came to the proper
conclusion—and, of course, this is doubtful given the
differences among them—these decisions demonstrate that at
least some investor-state arbitral decisions are also now
serving to re-empower the state. These annulment rulings do so
in three different ways.
As indicated, the CMS annulment formally upheld the
investor’s award. However, by going out of its way to severely
criticize the legal merits of that award, the CMS annulment
committee, consciously or not, made enforcement of the original
award considerably more difficult. Whether or not the CMS
annulment committee intended the result, the underlying
award in this case (as well as others rendered against
Argentina) have not been paid.117 As Koutoglidou’s paper
reminds us, it is always hard to secure payment from an entity
that enjoys sovereign immunity.118 Although ICSID awards are
more enforceable than most international obligations, they are
not immune from the fundamental weakness of all such
obligations: namely, that enforcement rests in the end on the
legitimacy of the obligation and a state’s desire to comply.119 By
casting doubt on the legitimacy of the underlying award, the
CMS annulment committee made it easier for Argentine
authorities to justify their continued refusal to pay. This
annulment decision, in effect, licensed Argentina’s continued
civil disobedience. Indeed, even assuming that the Argentine
authorities had been inclined to comply with the underlying
award if it had survived the annulment process, the CMS
annulment’s criticisms of the basis for the award renders the
public payment of such an award by a democratically
accountable body much more difficult to explain to Argentine
taxpayers. The CMS annulment, in short, empowers state
defiance of the law.
The Sempra award defers to state sovereignty in a
different way. Its controversial finding that what it deems to be
117. See, e.g., Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis
and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
449, 469 (2007) (quoting Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of
ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L ARBITRATION 1, 2 (2006)) (explaining that the
Argentine Ministry of Economy has taken the position that all such awards
are subject to local court review in Argentina because they are
“‘unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable.’”).
118. Koutoglidou, supra note 30.
119. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 117, at 465–469; ;Baldwin, supra note
117.
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an erroneous interpretation of the measures not precluded
clause constitutes a manifest “excess of powers,”120 and
therefore requires annulment, threatens to turn the limited
ICSID annulment process into a forum for full appellate review
of the legal findings issued by original ICSID panels. This is, as
is suggested by the CMS annulment ruling, not consistent with
what the states agreed to pursuant to the ICSID Convention or
the U.S.-Argentina BIT itself in reliance on that Convention.121
Moreover, the Sempra annulment’s finding that the measures
not precluded clause does not mean the customary defense of
necessity,122 appears to be a re-interpretation of the treaty in
light of what one of the state parties now argues is the case,
instead of an effort to give effect to what both of the parties
intended when they concluded their agreement in 1991.123 This
is a highly contestable approach to treaty interpretation.124
There does not appear to be any evidence that both parties
to the U.S.-Argentina BIT share a common view of what should
be the proper meaning of its measures not precluded clause
even today. Of course, the traditional rules of treaty
interpretation license resort to the “subsequent practice of the
parties.”125 As the plural indicates, these rules do not license
interpretation based on the current views of one of the treaty
parties and those rules do not authorize treaty interpreters to
speculate about what might be the views of both state parties
in the absence of evidence. The apparent contemporary view of
the U.S. Executive branch (as expressed in a letter written
after the Argentina claims were submitted and in the course of
another claim) was that a state party’s reliance on the
measures not precluded clause of a U.S. BIT would render the
underlying dispute inadmissible or non-justiciable since that
120. Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision,
para. 219 (June 29, 2010).
121. CMS Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 135–36 (Sept. 25,
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 251 (2009).
122. Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 198–200, 208–
09.
123. Cf. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 427–440.
124. But see Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.AJIL 179 (2010)
(proposing to “recalibrate the interpretative between states and tribunals” by
increasing tribunals’ reliance on the subsequent practice of states even when
that subsequent practice is in the context of other BITs or where the “common
practice” of the states in question is determined by their separate practices).
125. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(a), May 31, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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question was not subject to review by an arbitral body.126
Although Argentina in the course of the proceedings discussed
here also made the same claim, it accepted, in the Sempra case
among others that arbitral tribunals have the power to
examine whether Argentina’s invocation of necessity was in
good faith.127 Interestingly, none of the tribunals, including on
annulment, accepted either of these contentions by the United
States or Argentina. None accepted the proposition that
invocation of the measures not precluded clause renders an
underlying dispute inadmissible or non-justiciable and none
accepted the alternative argument that arbitral review was
limited to an examination of whether a party invokes this
clause in good faith.128
The Sempra annulment committee’s interpretation of the
relevant clause cannot therefore be justified on the basis of the
subsequent practice of the parties. There is no evidence cited
that both the United States and Argentina were of the entirely
different view, which ultimately convinced the annulment
committee, that the measures not precluded clause was a rule
of lex specialis intended to depart from the ordinarily applicable
rule, namely the customary defense of necessity (indeed, given
the U.S. government’s position, expressed in BITs concluded
after the U.S.-Argentina BIT, that the measures not precluded
clause is wholly self-judging, that government apparently sees
no need even today to take a position on that question).
Moreover, there is an even more fundamental objection to
the conclusion reached in the Sempra annulment. Even
assuming that the state parties had reached a common
understanding concerning the meaning of the measures not
precluded clause in their treaty, it is very doubtful that such a
view, nowhere expressed as an amendment to the treaty or
126. Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para. 382 (quoting part
of a letter from James H. Thessin, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser and
Designated Agency Ethics Official, United States Department of State, to
Abraham D. Sofaer, dated Sept. 15, 2006 (stating: “notwithstanding the
decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the position of the U.S. Government
is that the essential security language in our FCN treaties and Bilateral
Investment Treaties is self-judging, i.e., only the party itself is competent to
determine what is in its own essential security interests.”).).
127. See, e.g., Sempra Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, paras. 297–
298.
128. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 417–26; see also José E.
Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty
v. Argentina, Y.B. INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL. 2010-2011 (2011), available at
investmentclaims.com.
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licensed as a binding understanding that can bind investment
arbitrators in the U.S.-Argentina BIT (as compared to the
NAFTA for example),129 should retroactively be applied such as
to affect the rights of a third party investor who relies on a
different
original
understanding
when
making
its
investment.130 For these reasons, the Sempra annulment ruling
wrongly empowers the state through a retroactive reinterpretation not clearly endorsed by the subsequent practice
of the parties and also derogates from the rights that the treaty
originally accorded to a third party.
The Enron annulment ruling may be the most expansive
precedent in deference to sovereignty of the three. While that
decision avoids some of the flaws committed by the CMS or
Sempra annulment committees, it potentially expands the
scope of the customary defense of necessity. That defense, as is
well known, applies to all international obligations not subject
to special lex specialis rules.131 Although the precise rationale
of the Enron findings on this point is not altogether clear, the
annulment committee suggested that the underlying panel had
not clarified what amounts to “fault” in the context of
contribution to the situation of necessity.132 It further faulted
that tribunal for not answering questions such as the following:
“Must the conduct of the State in question be deliberate (in the
sense of being deliberately intended to bring about the
situation of necessity), or does it suffice that the conduct was
reckless or negligent, or is some even lesser degree of fault
sufficient?”133 It also accused the original tribunal of “cursory
129. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1131(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (authorizing the parties to issue binding interpretations of
the treaty).
130. Even Roberts, who generally supports the use of states’ subsequent
practices in the context of interpreting BITs, expresses doubts about whether
practices that effectively amend a treaty undertaken after an investor has
made its investment, should be permitted to detrimentally affect the settled
expectations of the investor through retroactive application. See Roberts,
supra note 124 , at 212-13 (arguing that late and unreasonable interpretations
should only have prospective effect).
131. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 178–186, 306–308 (2002) (commenting on the ILC’s articles
25, “Necessity,” and 55, “Lex specialis”).
132. Enron Decision, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment Decision,
paras. 385–
90 (July 30, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.
pdf.
133. Id. para. 389.
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reasoning,” insofar as it accepted the testimony of an economic
expert for the conclusion that “Argentina’s own ‘misguided’
policies contributed to the magnitude of the economic crisis,”134
and indicated that an economist’s conclusion was not relevant
to a determination that, as a matter of law, the state had
contributed to the situation of necessity.135
What is most surprising about the Enron annulment is
that it does not appear that any of these interpretative
questions were raised by the litigants themselves and argued
before the original panel. The Enron annulment appears to
make new law insofar as it finds that economic evidence cannot
serve to justify an application of a legal rule, namely the
customary defense of necessity.136 That annulment ruling also
fails to address clearly the issue of burden of proof. Prior to this
decision, most assumed that the burden of proving an
affirmative defense like the customary defense of necessity
rested on the party invoking it.137 (This would appear to be all
the more the case to the extent the Enron annulment
committee is suggesting that the motivation for the underlying
Argentine actions that allegedly contributed to the situation of
necessity might be relevant since Argentina is presumably in
the best position to prove whether its contributing actions were
negligent or deliberate.) The Enron annulment, however, says
nothing about the traditional allocation of burden of proof but
the committee was apparently not swayed by the fact that
Argentina failed to prove that it had not contributed to the
situation of necessity. This suggests that, for the annulment
committee, the burden of proof on this point rests with the
claimant. Finally, the Enron annulment says nothing about the
contention, based on the ILC’s articles of state responsibility,
that even assuming the defense of necessity had been properly
invoked, this does not absolve the invoking state from any

134. Id. para. 392.
135. See id. para. 393 (explaining that other evidence besides the expert’s
testimony should have been taken into consideration when making the
determination that the state had contributed to the situation of necessity).
136. See id. paras. 391–393 (“While an economist might regard a State’s
economic policies as misguided, and might conclude that such policies led to or
amplified the effects of an economic crisis, that would not of itself necessarily
mean that as matter of law, the State had ‘contributed to the situation of
necessity’ such as to preclude reliance on the principle of necessity under
customary international law.”).
137. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 473.

ALVAREZ - Final Version

2011]

4/22/2011 6:06 PM

THE RETURN OF THE STATE

249

financial liability otherwise due.138 The fact that the financial
award was annulled suggests that this annulment committee
assumed otherwise.
Like the Sempra annulment, the Enron annulment
empowers states by giving them a second bite at the apple
despite the limited basis for annulment permitted under
ICSID.139 More troubling is the possibility that the Enron
annulment may empower all states by making it easier to get
out of most of their international obligations. The Enron
annulment implies that the defense of necessity, formerly seen
as an exceedingly and purposely narrow excuse that has to be
affirmatively proven by those seeking to evade their
international obligations and a defense that does not, in any
case, absolve states from liability otherwise due, may be far
more expansive in scope and effect as well as easier to invoke
than was previously assumed—including by the International
Law Commission when it drafted Article 25 codifying that
defense.140
These arbitral rulings, among the few that have proceeded
through the full ICSID annulment process, demonstrate that
investor-state dispute settlement, long disparaged for its
supposedly “pro-investor” bias, ultimately may bend to the will
of those who built it, namely states. Investment arbitration was
sold on the premise that, like U.S. passage of its Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,141 neutral apolitical adjudication
would displace the politicized alternative, namely espousal of
investor claims by the U.S. State Department.142 The Argentina
138. See CRAWFORD, supra note 131, at 189–190.
139. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S 159, 4
I.L.M. 532 (permitting annulment if the original “Tribunal was not properly
constituted; . . . [it] manifestly exceeded its powers; . . . there was corruption
on the part of a member of the Tribunal; . . . there has been a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; . . . or the award has failed to
state the reasons on which it is based.”).
140. See CRAWFORD, supra note 131, at 178–186; see also Alvarez &
Khamsi, supra note 80, at 396–404, 427–440, 455–60 (discussing the
understanding and application of necessity under customary international
law).
141. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583 §§
1602–1605, 90 Stat. 2891, 2892 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1605).
142. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The
Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 159, at 160–61 (1993)
(“[T]he function of the BIT was to insulate private investment from politically
driven foreign or domestic public policy—in effect, to depoliticize investment
matters by placing the protection of private investment under an apolitical
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annulments—like some of those under the NAFTA involving
the United States as respondent143—suggest that this was
naïve. Politics does not stop at the door to ICSID. Investment
arbitrators, which, after all, invariably include one appointed
by the respondent state, do not necessarily ignore the political
concerns of those who could, if sufficiently dissatisfied with the
result, deploy their powers of exit and voice to undermine the
entire edifice of investor-state dispute settlement. These
arbitral decisions and possibly others can best be explained by
one salient political reality: in the wake of the latest global
economic crisis, BIT parties, including the United States, want
discretion to respond to such crises through any means
necessary.144 The state parties to investment protection
agreements—and at least some investment arbitrators—appear
to view the Argentina crisis cases through different eyes. They
are now saying to themselves, “there but for the grace of God go
I.”
A number of recent investor-state arbitral decisions
confirm the trend towards “re-balancing.” Another recent
decision, again involving Argentina, reads the GATT XX
jurisprudence, complete with its proportionality analysis, into
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, to the benefit of the respondent
state.145 Moreover, even the underlying awards criticized or
annulled in CMS, Sempra and Enron, suggested that a
successful claim of expropriation requires an act that is
effectively a government seizure of the investors’ entire
property and not merely a decrease in the profitability of an
enterprise.146 Those awards also suggested some sensitivity to
the needs of states; even those decisions indicated that
legal regime.”). For a critique of this common justification for investor-state
arbitration, see Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in
Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration (Oct. 1, 2010).
143. For criticism of the decision rendered in Loewen v. United States, see
Don Wallace, Jr., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial of Justice: Loewen
v. US and Chattin v. Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 669 (Todd Weiler, ed., 2005).
144. Thus, concerns over whether U.S. investment agreements would
adversely impact the United States government’s and other states’ powers to
prevent or mitigate future financial crises was one of the issues that divided
the U.S. Department of State’s subcommittee charged with reviewing the
current U.S. model BIT. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 101.
145. Continental Casualty v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award (Sept. 5, 2008), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyA
ward.pdf. For a critique of this decision, see Alvarez & Brink, supra note 128.
146. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 80, at 394.
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Argentina’s economic crisis and its impact needed to be taken
into account for purposes of determining the amount of liability
imposed on the state.147 Other investment arbitrations seem to
be incorporating or relying implicitly on a form of
proportionality reasoning that balances the rights of investors
with those of the state, including with respect to applying the
guarantee to accord investors fair and equitable treatment.148
Some recent arbitral decisions suggest, for example, that in
determining whether government action violates the legitimate
expectations of the investor, “the host State’s legitimate right
subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public
interest must be taken into consideration as well.”149 Moreover,
within the NAFTA, now subject to the NAFTA parties’
interpretation indicating that the FET guarantee in that treaty
means nothing more than what aliens were entitled to under
the customary rule assuring the international minimum
standard of treatment, one recent decision, Glamis Gold, limits
that right to the bare bones protections protected by denial of
justice claims circa 1927.150 In light of such rulings, fears that
investor claims under BITs and FTAs would dramatically
reduce the capacity of states to regulate appear overstated.151
III. SOVEREIGNTY REVISITED
There is a broader context to these developments. The
efforts to re-balance the rights of sovereigns vis-à-vis foreign
147. See id. at 403–04, 471; see also Alvarez & Brink supra note 128.
148. See,
e.g.,
Alec
Stone
Sweet,
Investor-State
Arbitration:
Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (2010).
149. See Saluka BV v. Czech Republic ¶ 305 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.
pdf.
150. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL Award ¶ 21 (2009)
(agreeing with United States’ contentions that FET remains subject to the
standard articulated in the Neer v. Mexico (4 R. Int’l Arb. 1926) case, but
suggesting that that standard, requiring a demonstration of “egregious”
conduct by the state, has evolved over time). But see Merrill & Ring Forestry
L.P. and Canada, ICSID Award, ¶¶ 190–213190-213 (Mar. 31, 2010) (finding
that the Neer standard was no longer the applicable customary international
law standard with respect to the treatment of aliens in relation to business,
trade and investment).
151. Cf. Osgoode Hall School of Law, Public Statement on the International
Investment
Regime,
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/
(discussing “[A] shared concern for the harm done to the public welfare by the
international investment regime, as currently structured, especially its
hampering of the ability of governments to act for their people in response to
the concerns of human development and environmental sustainability.”).
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investors increasingly evident in the text of BITs, national
laws, and even some arbitral awards, coincides with a much
chastened view of the “Washington Consensus.”152 Much of the
world has lost faith in the policy prescriptions that seem to
underlie BITs of the first generation; we have lost faith in
deregulation, privatization, the un-abashed protection of
property, and wholly unrestricted trade and capital flows. This
formula for state disempowerment in economic affairs has been
undermined by perceptions that it has not served to raise all
boats as anticipated. Empirical work casts doubt on whether
adherence to the formula—and entering into investment
protection agreements to evince a creditable commitment to
following it—produces enhanced capital flows or whether, even
when such capital comes, it will produce the sustained
economic development and beneficial spillovers anticipated.153
Columbia’s Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard’s Dani Rodrik, among
others, have seeded doubts about neo-liberal growth strategies
and whether history’s success stories—from the Asian Tigers to
the turn of the century industrializing United States—truly
adhered to them.154 Others have emphasized the negative
externalities often accompanying incoming capital flows,
including more unequal income distribution, politically
disruptive dislocations of people, and adverse social or
environmental effects.155 Some have suggested that properly
managing these challenges require actions that not anticipated
152. For an understanding of the Washington Consensus, see, e.g., John
Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus (Fundación CIDOB,
2004), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf.
153. See generally Lisa Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES
ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009) (collection of studies
considering the impact of BITs on the flow of foreign investment and on
economic development); José E. Alvarez, The NAFTA’s Investment Chapter
and Mexico, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN RELATION TO THE
FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LEGAL CULTURE (R.
Dolzer, et al. eds., 2006) (surveying the reasons why the NAFTA’s investment
chapter continues to elicit mixed views even as foreign investment flows into
Mexico have increased).
154. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002) (criticizing the promulgation of the “Washington Consensus”); Dani
Rodrik, Growth Strategies, in Handbook of Economic Growth (P. Aghion &
S.NN. Durlauf eds., (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), available at
http://econ2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ502/tesfatsion/GrowthStrategies.DRo
drik.GrowthHB2005.pdf (arguing that pursuit of the Washington Consensus
model has not produced economic development as anticipated).
155. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 153, at 250.
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or even prohibited by some BITs.156 In any case, handling such
externalities requires more, not less, government.
Of course, the global economic meltdown, and the
perception that this time it started with us, has also
undermined confidence in Western states’ and international
financial institutions’ advice on how best to achieve “good
governance.” IMF conditionality is viewed with more
skepticism today. This is particularly true for those who think,
as do many Argentineans, that IMF conditions led to the over
40 ICSID claims (face value said to be over $80 billion) against
their country.157 The age is past when the United States can
get away with handing out its Model BIT circa 1984 to
developing nations while saying, as early BIT negotiators did,
“here are the minimum conditions for a successful economy.”158
The United States’ evolving BIT sends a very different
message; it says that even the United States is experimenting
with the balance between the market and regulation and is no
longer confident that there is a one-size-fits-all formula for
success.
The chastened U.S. BIT program may be part of the
historical dialectic between champions of the market and
regulation described by Karl Polanyni in his 1944 classic, “The
Great Transformation”, or much more recently, by Amy
Chua.159 The challenge to the turn to the market marked by the
156. This may be the case, for example, to the extent a state seeks to
restrict foreign investors to particular sectors or particular regions or seeks to
impose on foreign investors performance requirements (such as requiring the
transfer for technology) barred by certain BITs or FTAs.
157. W.W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. OF WTO &
INT’L HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, 199, 200 (2008); Aktion Finanzplatz
International Conference on Illegitimate Debts Berne, Aktion Finanzplatz
Schweiz, Argentina 1976–2007: The Paradigmatic Case of an Extraordinarily
Legitimate
Debt
(Oct.
3–4,
2007),
http://www.aktionfinanzplatz.ch/pdf/kampagnen/illegitime/Keene_handout_en.
pdf.
158. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and
Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501 (1998) (discussing “the extent to which BITs
contribute to the creation of a liberal investment regime and the place of BITs
in economic development”).
159. The 1984 U.S. Model BIT can be seen as the embodiment of Polanyi’s
concept of utopian market liberalism, while the 2004 U.S. Model embodies his
“inevitable” protective countermovement to restore the “proper” role of
government in regulating the market. See generally, Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Foreword to Karl Polanyi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2d ed. 2001)
(“suggest[ing] that the challenge facing the global community today is whether
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rise of BITs is now evident in, for example, scholarly and civil
society challenges to the International Finance Corporation’s
advice (including with respect to its indices for “progress”
produced in its annual “Doing Business” reports which
confidently rank countries on how business-friendly the
national rule of law is).160 Eroding confidence in the global
structures for economic governance—and the perception that
these failed to prevent the latest global economic crisis and
were not particularly relevant to our painful recovery from
it161—has resulted in a more humble and slightly more
transparent IMF, no longer as confident about having the
answer. That institution, charged with advancing “good
governance,” now seems preoccupied with figuring out how best
to apply “good governance” to itself. Notably, the IMF’s ongoing efforts to change its weighted voting procedures are also
a form of sovereign empowerment as it is obvious that these
will give more clout to distinct states, such as Brazil and
India.162 Of course, the trend in favor of greater sovereign
“policy space” in the investment regime finds echoes in older
demands for the re-calibration of the WTO to permit its
adjudicators to have greater discretion to respect states’
capacity to comply with their non-trade obligations, including
those demanded by the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (such as to ensure the right to water or
health).163 That trend is also a component of those regimes that
remain dominated by national laws with extraterritorial effect,

it can redress these imbalances before it is too late”). See also Amy Chua,
WORLD ON FIRE (2002) (arguing that national cycles oscillating between
efforts to privatize and to renew government economic intervention are driven
by and have differing effects on minorities within certain countries); Amy
Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link between Markets and
Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995) (challenging
“the prevailing assessment of the historical “lessons” of privatization.”).
160. See, e.g., Kevin Davis and Michael Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law:
The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1095, 1096
(2007).
161. See, e.g., David Zaring, International institutional Performance in
Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 475 (2010).
162. See, e.g., Final Report, Comm. on IMF Governance Reform 14, Mar.
24, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.
pdf.
163. See generally Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AJIL 1
(2002) (discussing the positives of revisiting questions regarding facing “[a]
vast array of potential recipes for linkage to particular nontrade issues, as
well as cautionary tales against such linkage.”).
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such as what David Gerber’s “global competition” regime.164
What Hollywood would call “the revenge of the state” is
suggested, of course, by the revival of—if not nostalgia for—oldfashioned government regulation, including in the United
States. To the chagrin of the Tea Party movement, the actions
of the Obama Administration suggest a belated backlash to the
Reagan years, which memorably portrayed “government as the
problem.” The touted revival of government regulation in the
United States preceded Obama, of course, and included the
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,165 but it garnered public notice
given governments’ responses worldwide to the global economic
crisis. The consequential impact on governmental involvement
in the financial sector is particularly stark. Katharina Pistor
points out how, starting with a series of transactions that
began in the fall of 2007 that involved turning to sovereign
wealth funds to secure fresh capital, the largest financial
intermediaries have become increasingly dominated by
governments.166 She reports that at least as of 2009, the largest
stakeholder of the following banks was the United States
government: AIG (with an 85 percent stake), Bank of America
(6), and Citigroup (32).167 The second largest stakeholder in
Citigroup was also governmental: the government of Singapore
Investment Corporation with an 11 percent stake.168 The Qatar
Investment Authority was the leading stakeholder in Barclays
(12) and Credit Swiss (8), while the UK government was the
leading owner of HBOS (43), Lloyds (75), RBS (75).169 Pistor
also notes the obvious: the global crisis has expanded the role of
the home government of these banks from regulator (including
as part of corporate governance as with respect to executive
compensation) to that of capital provider or investor of last

164. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW, MARKETS, AND
GLOBALIZATION (2010) (presenting how “decision-makers in many parts of the
world recognize the potential value of economic competition and increasingly
seek to protect it from private restraints.”).
165. Sabarnes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
166. Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks and Governments
in the Global Crisis: Towards a New Governance of Global Finance, 10 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. Rev. 333, 335-36 (2009) (involving turning to sovereign wealth
funds to secure fresh capital, making the largest financial intermediaries
become increasingly dominated by governments).
167. Id. at 336, tbl. 1.
168. Id. at 341.
169. Id. at 336, tbl. 1.
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resort.170 She notes that even without formal voting rights, the
government owners of these banks are in a position to exert
substantial leverage over them and perhaps even over the
home governments of these banks.171
Whether we (or governments) should be pleased or
distressed by these developments is not the subject of this
essay. It may very well be true that old-fashioned
protectionism—including exaggerated concerns over the “outsourcing” of jobs—lies behind U.S. policy-makers’ concerns
over, for example, the state-owned enterprises of China. What
is clear is that governments’ efforts to re-secure their borders
and replenish their regulatory prowess responds at least in
part to the fact that the state is making a comeback through
the return of state-owned enterprises and the renewed clout of
impressively endowed sovereign wealth funds, whether based
in Norway, Qatar or Singapore. The changes to the investment
regime respond in part to doubts about whether we should
treat these entities—or long established Chinese owned
enterprises—as if they were no different from privately owned
multinational enterprises operating for commercial gain.172 We
are not as sure as we once were whether we should welcome all
foreigners so long as they come with lots of cash.
What this means is that governments are empowering
themselves along multiple dimensions. They are, as noted, reentering the economic marketplace. Despite widespread
privatization, they still or now control many enterprises that
seek to invest and direct the investment strategies of SWFs. At
the same time, they are shoring up their regulatory abilities to
better protect themselves from other governments’ exercises in
“state capitalism.”
To the proverbial “man armed with a hammer,” much
resembles a nail. To this author, the return of the state with
respect to finance and investment appears to be part of a
greater trend in favor of empowering the state that is occurring
outside international economic law as well. It is now
commonplace that the “war on terror” has given states a highly
persuasive new rationale to enhance their powers—whether
170. Id. at 332–44; 349–50.
171. Id. at 343.
172. See, e.g., Charles Kovacs, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Much Ado About
Some Money, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/sovereign-wealth-fundsmuch-ado-about-some-money; Veljko Fotak and William Megginson, Are SWFs
Welcome Now?, http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/are-swfs-welcome-now.
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with respect to its use of force (as in Afghanistan and through
drones) or through enhanced surveillance over individuals and
organizations. September 11th has created a vast new
battleground with respect to states and human rights where
the sites of contestation are not always subject to easy answers.
Henkin’s “S” word seems less curse word than blessing if “S”
claims to be protecting us from non-state actors armed with
WMDs.173 In human rights regimes as well as the investment
regime, states are increasingly resorting to their “security”
needs as ultimate trumps over the rights of non-state actors.
Whether we like the comparison or not, there are parallels
between these arguments—whether made in ICSID or before
UN human rights treaty bodies—and Carl Schmitt’s notorious
“law of the exception.”174
At least when it comes to security and perhaps more
generally, the Lotus presumption—states can act unless
explicitly forbidden—may be making a comeback.175 Charles
Tilly famously noted that “war made the state,”176 and even our
Supreme Court has suggested that the U.S. civil war made the
United States.177 Threats to security, real or imagined,
empower governments. Today, as is suggested by Argentina’s
173. Notably, the “S” word may actually serve to protect human rights
when the threat to these emerges from institutions of global governance, such
as the UN Security Council. See, e.g., Yassin Abdullah Kadi and al Barakaat
International Foundation v. Council of the European Union, European Court
of Justice, Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P 2008 E.C.R. X (hereinafter Kadi).
For some the European Court of Justice’s Kadi decision is an implicit judicial
affirmation that the European Union is now sufficiently “state-like” or
“sovereign” that its institutions, like the U.S. Supreme Court, can serve as a
bulwark against international law when it (or international organizations
acting under international law’s authority) threatens “constitutional” values.
See Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order after Kadi, 51 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (2009) (comparing the Kadi
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Medellin).
174. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 10 (1922) (G. Schweb trans. 2005). See also DAVID
DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW, LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
(2006).
175. This may even be true within the venerated International Court of
Justice. See, e.g., Declaration by Judge Simma, Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2010
I.C.J. 141 (July 22).
176. Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State-Making, in
THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 42 (Charles Tilly
ed. 1975).
177. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“. . . it has taken a
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they
created a nation,” J. Holmes).
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increasingly successful arguments before arbitral bodies, a
state’s “security” includes its economic security. Perhaps an
embracive notion of security and states’ desire to be free to deal
with all threats to it, more than any other factor, is serving to
re-make the investment regime—just as it appears to be
transforming other international regimes, including that
governing the use of force, the powers of the UN Security
Council, or the rules governing military occupation.178
Once we start appreciating how states empower
themselves, scholarly projects seeking to correct the flaws of
global governance regimes that we find take on a somewhat
different meaning. The many flaws in global governance may
be conscious (and successful) efforts by states or groups of
states to avoid supra-national regulation. They may not be
simply failings of the international legal imagination. Perhaps
fragmentation dilemmas among international regimes are the
product of forum-shifting/shopping by empowered states whose
interests are served by fragmented law.179 If so, these may be
all the more difficult to remedy. On the flip side, perhaps some
of the things we commend as “new forms of global governance”
may be something else when viewed through the “wrong” end of
the telescope—and we see them as exercises of state power.180
178. See generally, José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 AJIL 873 (2003) ([S]urvey[ing] the recent practice of the Council
to argue that, despite that body’s refusal to give explicit approval to Operation
Iraqi Freedom in advance, worries about the hegemonic capture of the
Security Council (along with other forms of global HIL) should not be
relegated to science fiction”). For a concrete example, see, e.g., Ellen
Nakashima, Blair Says U.S. May Target Americans, Terrorism, WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 2010 (quoting U.S. Director of National Intelligence who asserted that
the U.S. government can kill even U.S. nationals abroad if they are involved in
terrorist activities).
179. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New
Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60
STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007) (“[A]rgu[ing] that the problem of fragmentation is
more serious than is commonly assumed because it operates to sabotage the
evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international regulatory
system and to undermine the reputation of international law for integrity.”).
180. Jean Cohen argues, for example, that the morphing of international
organizations into global governance institutions does not herald the taming of
sovereignty as much as the instrumentalization of these institutions by
powerful nations. Cohen challenges the view that the world is steadily
advancing towards to a progressive, cosmopolitan order without sovereigns,
but argues instead that our global governance institutions authorize new
hierarchies and gradations of sovereignty, citing examples such as the
Security Council’s counter-terrorism “legislation.” Jean L. Cohen, Whose
Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, 18 ETH. & INT’L. AFF.
(2004/2005).
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That global governance regimes can manifest the “international
rule of law” and the interests of sovereigns should not surprise
us. The decision to expand the trade regime to encompass
intellectual property, after all, is commonly seen as a victory for
global regulation and the rule of law—as well as a controversial
exercise in hegemonic international law.181 In terms of the
papers presented at this conference, perhaps we should see the
G20, for example, as both a new form of global governance and
as revival of a (very old)”Concert of Europe.”182
Recognizing the continuing role of sovereignty has value.
As noted, it improves our descriptions of reality. It enables us
to see things as they are and not as we would like them to be. It
is also likely to improve our policy prescriptions. Marian
Pardo’s examination of Ecuador’s distinct approaches to
privatization, for example, suggests that all too often we
international lawyers wrongly assume that a problem is solved
once a treaty is concluded or an international organization is
established and we fail to consider how the purpose of the
treaty or of the organization might be altered, sometimes
dramatically, given what states do by way of implementation.
Pardo’s sovereignty-focused work connects with other
scholarship indicating that national institutions, practices and
laws, and not only the form or structure of global regulation,
may determine whether efforts at international regulation or
adjudication succeed. Work by Laurence Helfer and Karen
Alter on the mixed experiences of the Andean Tribunal of
Justice, which was modeled on the European Court of Justice,
to cite another example, provides a sharp reminder of the
continued relevance of the states—and differing cultural and
legal traditions—in which supra-national institutions are
embedded.183 Theirs is a sharp rebuke to those who believe that
there is a standard global law toolbox containing mostly
European models that can be deployed across the planet to
181. See Ruth Rikowski, A Marxist Analysis of the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property
Rights, 4 POL’Y FUT. IN EDUC. 396, 407 (2006) (“[E]xamin[ing] the World Trade
Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).”). For a comparable argument involving the
“legislative” actions of the UN Security Council, see Alvarez, supra note 178 at
873.
182. Compare Kelly & Cho, supra note 26, with Zaring, supra note 27.
183. Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice
and Its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patterns in The
Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 871 (2009).
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yield comparable results. Grounding the “transnational legal
process” in, among other things, the actions and reactions of
receiving states, the demands of their domestic elites, and local
structures for governance is precisely the point as well of
Gregory Shaffer’s recent work.184 All of these are concrete
examples of why the return of the state matters. Paying
attention to the continuing role of sovereigns may make us
more effective builders of regimes enabling global governance.
IV. CAVEATS
My “return of the state” should not be misunderstood. I am
not suggesting that all states have been equally empowered,
even within the changing investment regime. Sovereign
equality, if it ever existed, has not miraculously returned. A
more proper, but less catchy, title for this essay might be “the
return of some states.” The fact that an economic power like the
United States is leading the drive to “re-balance” the
investment regime is no accident. Moreover, even those states
that are re-balancing their BITs are not necessarily doing so in
the same way or to the same degree. Although many states are
emulating the sovereignty-enhancing aspects of the post 2004
U.S. Model BIT, not all states will enhance their relative
powers over investors using the same tools. Some, like China,
may decide to reserve greater policy discretion over their
exchange rates or their ability to allocate foreign investors to
particular parts of the country, for example. Other states may
not be able to assert their own sovereign preferences in quite
the same way as the Chinese or the United States. Many
African states will likely remain parties to older much more
pro-investor BITs based on models comparable to those of the
U.S. Model BIT of 1984. Not all states will be able to deploy
their “exit and voice” options equally, whether within the
investment regime or in other international regimes. Despite
its multilateral aspirations and effects, the international
investment regime remains subject to bilateral leverage. Interstate power dynamics will, as always, continue to determine
which state gets a chance to adapt a new BIT model, renegotiate its old BITs, ignore unfavorable arbitral rulings, or
leave ICSID. Nor are the political dynamics in investment
arbitrations likely to benefit all respondent states equally.
184. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change:
Opportunities and Constraints, (IILJ Working Paper 2010/4, 2010) available at
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2010-4.Shaffer.pdf.
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The claim here should not be confused with those made by
those who disparage the power or worth of international law.
The changes to the U.S. Model BIT over time reflect, on the
contrary, the power of international law and its remedies. The
U.S. and other states are engaging in “re-balancing” the
investment regime precisely because they are afraid of the
political and legal consequences of investor-state dispute
settlement. One does not deploy exit and voice against a regime
that has no relevance. Nor should my claims about the United
States’ role in leading the sovereign backlash to the investment
regime be conflated with U.S. resistance to other international
legal regimes. While some U.S. critics of investor-state
arbitration may be hostile to all forms of supra-national
adjudication, many draw distinctions based on subject matter
or the perceived threat to “democratic governance” posed by
distinct international regimes. Indeed, the leading NGO voices
against the international investment regimes based in the
United States are far more likely to support strongly
sovereignty-intrusive regimes if these concern the protection of
human rights or the environment.
Changing attitudes toward the investment regime within
the U.S. government reflect, more than anything else, the fact
that the United States, which has long been the world’s leading
capital exporter and its leading importer, now faces the serious
threat of suit from foreign investors within its borders. Other
states, including those who are strong supporters of
international law and international legal regimes, such as
Canada, are reacting the same way. The global backlash
against the international investment regime has little to do
with U.S. political attitudes towards international regimes—
and are not likely to change dramatically as between the Bush
and Obama Administrations.185 It also has little, if anything, to
do with the United States’ arguably declining status as a superpower. The United States shares its status as capital
importer/exporter with many others, including economic superpowers such as China. That both the United States and China
are reacting to this reality by changing their respective
investment treaties demonstrates the enduring power of the
reciprocal application of international law.
The examples of state empowerment discussed here are not
signposts indicating the end of history. The return of the state
185. Indeed, nearly all of the changes to the U.S. Model BIT from 1984–
2004 described here occurred during the Bush Administration.
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does not mean that renewed efforts to regulate internationally
on economic or other matters will not occur. On the contrary, as
noted, the return of the state may be a cyclical turn in a neverending dialectic. Indeed, some of the developments noted in
this essay—such as the expanding power of SWFs—are likely
to lead to new efforts by states to protect themselves at the
international level. SWFs may assert untoward powers vis-àvis countries in which they invest. Although SWFs are
examples of state empowerment, the United States is not
empowered by Norway’s or Qatar’s SWF. The existence of
powerful SWFs and other state-run ventures is likely to lead to
new ventures to cooperate internationally—as appears to be
occurring as guidelines emerge with respect to SWFs.186
My “return of the state” describes reality but does not
celebrate it. While some lawyers, such as human rights
advocates, have tended to assume that “the erosion of
sovereignty is a bell-weather of progress,”187 no such claim is
made here. Nor do I claim the opposite. Perhaps restoring
greater sovereign policy space is a needed corrective measure
within the investment regime, perhaps not. My simple point is
that both critics and proponents of the investment, and other
international, regimes need to recognize empowerment when it
occurs – and must take it into account in their assessments and
in their proposals for reform.
V. CONCLUSION
We live in an age of such massive and continuous change
that announcements of new paradigms are routinely expected.
This essay is bound to disappoint. It adheres to a very old
paradigm indeed: Westphalia. It’s obvious target are those
many scholars who have argued, for over a decade, that the
state is “withering away,” is “waning,” is in “decline,” “retreat,”
is already gone, or perhaps was always a “myth.”188 Those
186. See, e.g., The Santiago Principles, Elaborated by the International
Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds in Nov. 2008 Based on earlier
work undertaken by the IMF, http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm; see
also OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Countries,
June 4–5,4-5, 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/14/41816692.pdf.
187. See Karima Bennoune, ‘Sovereignty vs. Suffering’? Re-examining
Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EJIL 243, 243
(2002).
188. For articles making these arguments see, e.g., Eli Lauterpacht,
Sovereignty–Myth or Reality?, 73 INT’L. AFF. 131 (1997); Christoph Schreuer,
The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for
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political scientists and lawyers have been a tad premature in
declaring the death of the state. Perhaps some of them have
confused their normative agenda with reality. Perhaps some
have seen “global governance” as a purely binary proposition.
Whatever the reason, they are wrong. The state is changing, as
it always has, but it is not extinct. Indeed, even with respect to
so-called “failed states,” the international community typically
seeks to restore the status quo. In such cases, we try to recreate something that resembles a state because no one knows
what to do with something that is not a state or part of one.189
The Westphalian system may be a blink of an eye in the scope
of human history but we are living in its time. No one
unfortunate enough to be outside Koskenneimi’s “wonderful
artificiality” of statehood190believes that it is a myth. Ask a
Palestinian. As Michael Walzer put it in a recent lecture, only
those lucky enough to live in a functioning state can afford to
suggest that it is “withering away.”191
At the same time, those of us working to improve the
structures of global governance are not wasting our time. State
power and global governance are not defining end points in a
zero sum game. The Wimbledon case had it right. State power
co-exists with and may be enhanced by global governance—
even if sometimes the cyclical pendulum swings more towards
one end.192 At times, global institutions like the UN Security
International Law?, 4 EJIL 447 (1993); Weiss et. al, Sovereignty Under Siege:
From Intervention to Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND WESTPAHALIA?: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 87 (G. Lyons and M.
Mastaduno, eds.1995); CAMILLERI & J. FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); Rosas, The
Decline of Sovereignty: Legal Perspectives, in THE FUTURE OF THE NATION
STATE IN EUROPE (Livonen, ed. 1993); Vincent Cable, What Future for the
Nation State?, 124 DAEDALUS 23 (1995). See also Neil MacCormick, Beyond
the Sovereign State, 56 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1993).
189. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE
FAILURE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
43-65 (2010).
190. Martti Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of States, 88 ASIL
ANN. MEETING PROCEEDINGS 22 (1994). See also Benedict Kingsbury,
Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EJIL 599 (1998) (arguing that “discarding
sovereignty…will intensify inequality, weak[en] restraints on coercive
intervention, dimini[sh] critical roles of the state as the locus of identify and
an autonomous zone of politics, and redivid[e] the world into zones”, as
between “liberal” and “non-liberal” states); Bennoune, supra note 187 at 243
(arguing that sovereignty may sometimes serve to protect human rights).
191. Michael Walzer, Global and Local Justice, Straus Lecture at N.Y.U
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nyustraus.org/events/PublicLecture_Walzer.html.
192. The dichotomous reasoning of those who have suggested that global
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Council or the WTO Appellate Body empower some states more
than others. This essay does not suggest that global governance
is in decline or that attempts to make it better are futile. Its
only claim is that the state continues to matter the most to our
schemes for global law—as Grotius, on behalf of his state
clients, would have been the first to acknowledge.

governance efforts imply the withering away of the state is suggestive of the
absolutist notions of sovereignty associated with Thomas Hobbes and Jean
Boudin. Few international lawyers or political scientists should espouse such
absolutist conceptions of statehood today. Such binary thinking ignores the
fact that sovereign power lies along a spectrum. See José E. Alvarez, The
Future of State Sovereignty, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW—FOR A
REALISTIC UTOPIA (Antonio Cassese, ed. forthcoming 2011). Indeed, even
Bodin contended that his “absolute” sovereign was somehow still bound by
natural law, custom, and the need to respect property rights. JEAN BODIN, ON
SOVEREIGNTY 44, 45 (Julian H. Franklin, ed. and trans. 1992). Interestingly,
the United States’ adoption of a self-judging essential security exception in its
post-2004 investment treaties (see Price, supra note 104) suggests a more
absolutist vision of governments’ power to destroy rights to property than was
entertained by even Bodin.

